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Abstract. The topic of the present article is the destruction of the common 
sense tradition linked to the urbanity of philosophy, which had deep roots 
both in the European and Hungarian traditions. This destruction was based on 
Hegelian ideas by János Erdélyi as an argument of the greatest philosophical 
controversy of the Hungarian philosophical life in the 1850s. In Erdélyi’s 
argumentation, the turn from the supposed urbanity to the supposed rurality 
of the common sense has a fundamental role. The idea of the rurality of the 
common sense has an influence on the Hungarian intellectual history of the 
next centuries, as well.
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Introduction
It is highly rare that someone formulates their concept of philosophy and their 
own philosophical programme against the common sense, as an opposite of it, as 
János Erdélyi does it in his ‘The Present of the Inland Philosophy’:
I would be happy if it were explained what is the advantage to recommend 
to the […] Hungarian people something what does not need to learn, just 
to know based on the common sense,. Oh, my dear common sense! […] 
The common sense can easily be compatible with superstition, ignorance, 
stagnancy, all the moral and material wrong […]. Contrary, for all great 
things, which were for the progress of the humankind, there are deep, 
serious, secure and sublime marks of the thought. (Erdélyi 1981: 43)1
1 The same in the original Hungarian text: „Nagy örömemre szolgálna ezek után, ha 
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Erdélyi’s discussion paper was published at first as a series of periodical 
articles in 1856 and then as a separate volume in the following year, as well. 
Its interpretations in the cultural memory of the Hungarian philosophy are 
essentially identical; Erdélyi’s writing is a turning point from the dilettante idea 
of the national philosophy to a professional philosophy in accordance with the 
international trends. It is an inevitable fact that Erdélyi’s work was a constant 
reference for highly different philosophers with a single common feature, the 
defence of a differently formulated concept of the professional philosophy from 
differently constructed enemies.
One of the first examples is Károly Böhm’s editorial preface for the first issue 
of the ‘Hungarian Philosophical Review’ published in 1882. His main problem is 
the relationship of philosophy and practice and the rights of theory formulated 
as a contrast to practice. He did not refer to Erdélyi in a concrete manner – it is 
not a treatise, just a short preface without references and bibliography –, but he 
repeated Erdélyi’s critique of Hetényi and Szontagh:
A mind engaged with the questions of the practical life can fail when 
making judgements on the practical utility of abstract doctrines. In our 
culture, Hetényi and Szontagh overestimated the practice when they 
stated the impracticality of the idealistic ‘Sophie-style’ knowledge, against 
the Hegelians. It is true that philosophy was never directly practical, did 
not teach anybody directly to create steam ships, telegraphs, or other new 
inventions. But such practical things do not represent the whole of practical 
life. All of them are just instruments for achieving a much more sublime and 
practical end […]. This practical end is the ideal disposition of the human 
life; we can achieve it with the different tools of the practice; and philosophy 
teaches to understand it, to argument for it, and to explain it consciously. 
(Aigner–Böhm 2017: 260; originally published in 1882)2
kimagyaráztatnék; mi elsőbbséggel jár az, ha […] a magyar […] népnek […] egyre az ajánltatik, mit 
tanulni nem kell, hanem csak tudni – a józan ész szerint? Édes józan eszem! […] De mindamellett 
nem terem-e meg igen könnyen a józan ésszel a babona, tudatlanság, tespedés, minden erkölcsi 
és anyagi rossz […]? Ellenben minden nagy dolgon, mely az emberiséget elővitte, a gondolkodás 
mély és komoly, nyugodt és fenséges nyomai látszanak.” In the following, I will quote the 
Hungarian sources in my English translation, with the original Hungarian text in the footnotes.
2 In Hungarian: „Mert a gyakorlati élet kérdéseivel elfoglalt elme könnyen tévedhet, mikor 
e l v o n t  tanok életrevalóságáról ítélni készül. Nálunk pedig Hetényi és Szontagh nagyon is 
a gyakorlat malmára hajtották a vizet, mikor Hegel követőivel szemben az ilyen idealisztikus 
>>Zsófi-féle<< ismeret impraktikus voltát hirdették. Közvetlenül gyakorlati, az igaz, a filozófia 
nem volt soha; nem tanított meg közvetlenül senkit vasutak, gőzhajók, távírók s egyéb új 
találmányok megalkotására. Azonban az i l y e n  gyakorlati dolgok még nem teszik az e g é s z 
gyakorlati életet. Mindezek csak e s z k ö z ö k  egy sokkal magasztosabb gyakorlati cél elérésére 
[…]. Az emberi életnek ideálszerű berendezése, ez a gyakorlati cél; erre szolgálnak a gyakorlat 
változatos eszközei, s e célt megérteni, indokolni, öntudatosan kifejteni, erre csak a filozófia 
tanít.”
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In the following century, Gyula Kornis talks about the triumph of ‘pure 
logicism’ in Europe over the ‘philosophy of Dollar’ of the American technological 
civilization:
[Erdélyi] as a real Hegelian, defends German idealism and the theoretical 
character of philosophy with a satirical enthusiasm against the Szontaghs’ 
attack. The first conscious attack of logicism against phychologism appeared 
in this polemic, for the first time in the history of Hungarian thought; 
it was incarnated in the one-sided practical character of the Hungarian 
harmonistic philosophy, by a modern term, in the form of pragmatism. 
Szontagh clearly formulates the theory of the truth of pragmatism. […] If 
he had anticipated that this theory of truth would be born in America, 
half a century later, he would have recommended the technical home of 
the philosophy of Dollar for the Hungarians as an ideal. […] It has never 
been thought at such a low level about philosophy in our culture; Hegel’s 
Hungarian disciple reflected to it by these words. (Kornis 1944: 35)3
Surprisingly, the evaluation of Erdélyi’s writings did not change in the Marxist 
historiography of philosophy; however, it was formulated at first against Kornis: 
[Szontagh’s philosophy] was a reactionary, agnostic philosophy, a mixture 
of the Kantianism and Humeanism […] Szontagh was the first Hungarian 
neo-Kantian […], the ancestor of the paulers and kornises.4 (Heller 1952: 
411–412)5
There is no place here for a detailed analysis of the interpretations appeared 
in the professional historiography of Hungarian philosophy. We must mention 
Endre Kiss’s approach to Erdélyi’s concept of the common sense, connected 
to the everyday usage of language and its conservatism (Kiss 1984). However, 
3 In Hungarian: „[Erdélyi] mint vérbeli hegeliánus, szatirikus hévvel védi meg Szontaghék 
támadásával szemben a német idealizmust s ezzel a filozófia teoretikus jellegét. E polémiában 
tűnik elénk a magyar gondolkodás történetében a logizmus első tudatos támadása a 
pszichologizmus ellen, mely a magyar egyezményes rendszer egyoldalúan gyakorlati, életrevaló 
jellegében, mai műszóval élve, a pragmatizmus formáját öltötte fel. Szontagh ugyanis egész 
világosan megformulázza a pragmatizmus igazságelméletét […]. S mintha már megsejtette 
volna, hogy ez a pragmatista igazságteória félszázad múlva Amerikában fog megszületni: már 
ekkor a dollárfilozófia technikai hazáját állítja oda a magyarnak eszményképül. […] Sohasem 
gondolkoztak – fakad ki ennek hallatára Hegel magyar tanítványa – még oly alacsonyan nálunk 
a bölcsészet dolgában.”
4 It was a common rhetorical element in this epoch to type in minuscule the initial letter of a 
family name used in plural, for expressing a pejorative opinion of a criticized person.
5 In Hungarian: „[Szontagh filozófiája] reakciós, agnosztikus filozófia volt: a kantianizmus és a 
humeianizmus keveréke […] Szontagh az első magyar újkantianus […], a paulerek és kornisok 
őse.”
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Erdélyi’s philosophy of language is truly one of the most important parts of his 
œuvre, which was touched upon in my previous publications, as well; I have 
chosen another topic for the present article.
In the following, I will describe at first Erdélyi’s chain of ideas about the 
common sense, after which the possible reason of his position against the common 
sense will be problematized. For an answer, the function of the development of 
a modern concept of the common sense must be outlined under conditions of 
the changing structure of the philosophical communication in modernity in the 
European philosophy in general and especially in Hungarian philosophy. In the 
end, the consequences of the neglected concept of the common sense in Erdélyi’s 
thought and in the intellectual life of the next generations will be outlined.
Erdélyi’s Critique of the Philosophy of His Age
Erdélyi has identified the disadvantages of the thought of his opponents in their 
three main biases in the formulations of the requirements of the Hungarian 
philosophy; they are the needed usefulness, popular language, and (Hungarian) 
nationality of the philosophical works, formulated by his opponents, János 
Hetényi and Gusztáv Szontagh, based on a concept of the common sense. All 
of these three features were considered by him as contradictory to professional 
philosophy. Actually, at the very beginning of his chain of ideas, it becomes clear 
that he does not defend professional philosophy in general but the positions of a 
particular system. At the end of his writing, it will be evident that it is identical 
with the Hegelianism interpreted by him. At first, he opposes the epistemological 
approach of the foundations of philosophy, without a direct reference to Kant but 
clearly against the Kantian critique of the reason: 
The endeavour of the philosophers who always think about what we can 
know and what we cannot; it is to mark the borders of the knowledge. 
(Erdélyi 1981: 28)6
From this basis, he suddenly derives the critique of a topic of the Hungarian 
philosophical discourse of his age:
It was anticipated that this and this philosophy fits the Hungarian mind; it 
can and must receive such and such quantity from it; it is equivalent with 
the statement that the cultivation of philosophy beyond the established 
6 In Hungarian: „Legalább ide megy ki azok igyekezete, kik bölcselkedvén, örökké azon törik 
fejüket: mit lehet tudni, mit nem; s erőnek erejével ki akarnák jelölni, hogy meddig terjedjen a 
tudás határa.”
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borders is a sin committed against the nation and the common sense. 
(Erdélyi 1981: 28)7
Consequently, by his ideas, both the approaches of philosophy in its focus of 
the questions of what I can know as a human and what I can know as a Hungarian 
are wrong. He uses the concepts of reason, spirit, and idea as opposites of the 
common sense, which is not possible for the philosophical practice because it is 
not a useful tool for achieving the Hegelian dialectic:
The idea […] contains all the singularities and opposites […] as stating and 
negating elements because it is the way of becoming. This point is the top of 
speculation where all the things are opposites or syntheses of the opposites. 
A purely distinctive thinking, frozen in its distinctions will never achieve 
these heights. Consequently, the common culture, the so-called common 
sense realizes ‘inconsequence’ in its greatest men in every country but does 
not care about higher correspondences. (Erdélyi 1981: 34)8
The requirement of usefulness appeared for him as the rejection of the aim of 
the pure scientific knowledge for the advantages of practicality. After discussing 
this topic, his next target is the popular language of philosophy as a false 
requirement:
All sciences, other conscious human activities and crafts must be learnt; 
philosophy is the sole exception. Everybody wants to learn it less and less 
but know it more and more, based on a birth right marked by the common 
sense. (Erdélyi 1981: 35)9
The aim of popular language was an evidence for him that their opponents had 
given up the norm of the well-defined academic vocabulary of philosophy. By his 
argumentation, his opponents do not yet feel the need of a precise terminology 
7 In Hungarian: „már előre kimondatott, hogy a magyar elmének ez s ez bölcsészet való, s ennyit 
vagy annyit bír el és kell elbírnia műveléséből; mintha mondatnék, hogy a kiszabott mértéken 
túl bölcselkedni aztán nemzet és józan ész elleni vétség.”
8 In Hungarian: »A[…]z eszm[ében …] különösségek, ellentétek sőt ellenmondatok megvannak 
[…] mint […] állító és tagadó elemek, mert ez az útja a létesülésnek. És e ponton igazán az 
elmélődés (speculatio) magasságain vesszük magunkat észre, hol minden csupa ellenmondás, 
vagyis ellenmondások egysége. E magasságra a pusztán csak különböztető, és különbözéseiben 
megfagyó gondolkodás soha de soha fel nem jut. Azért volt, van és lesz, hogy a közrendű műveltség, 
az úgynevezett józan ész, miképp nálunk úgy másoknál is, rendesen „inconsequentiákat” vesz 
észre legnagyobb embereiben; de a felsőbb egybefüggést nem is keresi.«
9 In Hungarian: „Minden tudománynak vagy bármely célzatos emberi munkásságnak, minő avagy 
csak a mesteremberek foglalkozása is, megadatik, hogy tanulni kell. Csak a bölcsészet e részben 
kivétel; mert mennél kevésbé tanultatik, annál jobban akar tudatni, és ezt valami születési jognál 
fogva követeli magának, mégpedig a józan ész nevében boldog, boldogtalan.”
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because of their low-level philosophical practice that can be managed without 
professional terminology:
I can see that people are afraid of the idealism concerning language and 
the common sense. They defend language against science. I believe that on 
the level of the development where our popular philosophers are they do 
not need a precise terminology to explain their thoughts, and they can be 
satisfied by the service of the common language. (Erdélyi 1981: 36)10
The critique of the third bias, the idea of nationality in philosophy is 
connected to his Hegelian way of thinking, as well. He can connect literature 
and arts as emotional phenomena to the nation, disregarding the concept of 
Weltliteratur and connect philosophy to the whole of humanity, disregarding 
the fragmentation of its empirical audience by language borders, based on the 
Hegelian concepts of reason and spirit. In his argumentation, a Hegelian vision 
of the end of the history of philosophy has a special importance. However, 
the objects of the reason and spirit were always universal, but all the history 
of philosophy was needed for the explicit universality in the history. By his 
argumentation, there were particular philosophical cultures, but in his own age 
it is the epoch when their possibility ended:
The spring days of the eclectic philosophy and the particularities of 
national philosophies, such as the English or Scottish common sense, the 
French Enlightenment, and the German subjectivity, disappeared. A new 
floor has been finished in the building of science; we should inhabit and 
reinforce it for going further. (Erdélyi 1981: 96) […] In this part, the German 
spirit has the triumph. (Erdélyi 1981: 95)11
By his self-image, the task of his generation is to eliminate the remained local 
particularities of philosophy for achieving the Hegelian ending point in the 
thought of every civilized nation, amongst them the Hungarians.
10 In Hungarian: „Különösen valami aggodalmas félelmet látok az idealizmustóli óvakodásokban 
nyelvre, józan észre nézve. A tudománytól féltik a nyelvet. Elhiszem, hogy azon fokáig 
a haladásnak, meddig a mi keletben levő bölcsészeink feljutottak, nincs szükség a gondolat 
megjelölése végett szabatos nyelvre, s meg lehet elégedni a közbeszéd szolgálatával.”
11 In Hungarian: „elvirultak a váladékos (eklektikus) bölcsészet tavaszi napjai; szinte késői 
dolgok a nemzeti bölcsészet ferdén látott alakulásai: az angol vagy a skót közérzék, a francia 
felvilágosodás, a német alanyiság részszerintiségei. A tudomány épületén egy új emelet van 
készen; ezt kell meglaknunk, megerősítnünk, hogy tovább léphessünk. […] E részben a német 
szellemet illeti a dicsőség.”
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Common Sense as a Rural and Conservative 
Phenomenon in Erdélyi’s Theory
There is a special significance of the supposed rurality of the common sense in 
the argumentation of Erdélyi. At first, he summarizes that all obstacles of the 
professional philosophy are based on the common sense: “all these superstitions 
are cultivated and taught in the name of the common sense” (Erdélyi 1981: 55).12
After the numerous pejorative references to the common sense, he must 
formulate his own common sense concept. In this formulation, he identifies at 
first the common sense with the conservatism of the everyday thinking, both in 
the public life and philosophy:
The common sense wants always the perfected; it cannot be renewed. The 
spirit, on the contrary, always follows its own way, makes the progress of 
the world. […] Because the common sense always wants the perfected, 
it consequently insists on the perfect truths which were established in 
a philosophical or political school long time ago for eternity. (Erdélyi 
1981: 57)13
It is interesting that Erdélyi’s examples of the innovation against the conservatism 
of the common sense come from the fields of the sciences, economy, and the 
linguistic reform, as well. (The lack of social and political reforms is probably the 
consequence of the calculation with the possibilities of the publication, under 
conditions of the censorship in the age of neo-absolutism.) The counter-concepts 
of the conservative common sense and the progressive spirit, formulated above, 
have been fulfilled by concrete content in here:
What was the role of the common sense? By the evidence of the history 
of the spirit that the innovators, such as Galilei as scientist, Széchenyi as 
economist, or Kazinczy as linguist, are usually the ones who receive the 
first critique on the part of common sense. (Erdélyi 1981: 57)14
12 In Hungarian: „mindez előítéletek a józan ész nevében tanítatnak, ápoltatnak”.
13 In Hungarian: „Így az józan ész mindig a bevégzettet akarja, vitatja; újjá megeredni, megújhodni 
már nincs módjában. Ellenben a szellem mind a mellett folytatja a maga útját, viszi elő a világot 
[…]. És mert a józan ész mindig a bevégzettet akarja, örömest ragaszkodik a kész igazságokhoz, 
melyeket valamely bölcsészeti vagy politikai felekezet valaha elvekké tett, mintegy örökig tartó 
érvényességgel felruházott.”
14 In Hungarian: „Elvégre tehát miben látjuk szerepelni a józan észt? Az eszme története úgy tartja, 
hogy az újítók, akár Galilei, mint természetbúvár, akár Széchenyi, mint államgazdász, akár 
Kazinczy, mint nyelvész lett légyen az, rendszerint a józan észtől kapják az első ellenmondást.”
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Erdélyi has formulated a non-communicative concept of the common sense. 
There is no social communication, just standard biases against the progressive 
initiatives:
The common sense can easily be compatible with superstition, ignorance, 
stagnancy, all the moral and material wrong […] Contrary, for all great 
things, which were for the progress of the humankind, there are deep, 
serious, secure and sublime marks of the thought. (Erdélyi 1981: 43)15
Their main types are the ignorance and malignancy toward modern technology, 
such as the railway network, and toward the institutions of the established 
Enlightenment, mainly the system of public education. By the last example of 
Erdélyi, a rural housewife was against the school education of her daughter 
because a literate girl could could write letter for her lover, as an adult; and this 
idea against women’s education is based on a common sense judgement:
Recently, we care more about things than persons; improvement of sheep 
and cattle was more important than the improvement of humans; it was 
said that educated humans could feel more deeply their troubles. Country 
women have prohibited the education of their daughters for literacy 
because a literate girl could send letter for her lover. (Erdélyi 1981: 56)16
With these words, Erdélyi eliminated the urbanity of this programme, 
disregarded Hetényi’s ideas of the urbanity of the common-sense-based national 
philosophy for creating a non-communicative concept of the common sense. As 
Hetényi wrote; ‘a national culture must come from the cities as law comes from 
Zion’ (Hetényi 1841: 239).17
Gábor Kovács has recently problematized the origin of the Hungarian expression 
of the ‘peasant’s common sense’ [józan paraszti ész] based on his previous 
analysis of the national characterology of Huizinga (Kovács 2015). Huizinga has 
identified the Dutch and the burgher characters with patriotic pride, and urbane 
common sense is given high importance in his description. The concept of 
common sense was usually connected with urbanity in all epochs of intellectual 
history; rurality of the common sense seems to be a Hungarian speciality. By my 
15 In Hungarian: „De mindamellett nem terem-e meg igen könnyen a józan ésszel a babona, 
tudatlanság, tespedés, minden erkölcsi és anyagi rossz […]? Ellenben minden nagy dolgon, mely 
az emberiséget elővitte, a gondolkodás mély és komoly, nyugodt és fenséges nyomai látszanak.”
16 In Hungarian: „Még nem régen is több gond volt nálunk a dologra, mint a személyekre; juh, 
marhanemesítés hamarább lett közteendővé, mint az ember nemesítése és mondatott, hogy a 
nevelt ember csak jobban fogná érezni bajait. A falusi asszony pedig azért nem hagyá írásra 
taníttatni leányát, hogy levelet fog küldeni szeretőjének.”
17 In Hungarian: „a városokból kell kimenni a nemzeti miveltségnek, mint Sionból a törvénynek.”
31Ruralization of the (Urbane) Concept of Sensus Communis...
opinion, this Hungarian idea has its roots in Erdélyi’s thought; the opposition of 
the conservative, rural common sense and the spirit of the progressive urbane 
civilization are essential. According to Erdélyi’s ideas, this rural common sense 
has a negative role in history, but the critics of modernity in the 20th century 
could use the pattern established by him against urbanity, for the ideas of an 
agrarian populism, as well.
The Tradition of Sensus Communis in the History of 
Philosophy according to Erdélyi’s Interpretation
The consequence of Erdélyi’s above detailed ideas about the common sense was 
that he does not regard the concept of common sense as a philosophical term and 
that he regards the ones who take common sense seriously as dilettantes, based 
on these ideas. His opinion is more complex; by his argumentation, the core of 
the problem is the appearance of common sense in philosophy:
the theory of the common sense was ruined by the philosophers when they 
made from it more than it was possible, and they attributed to it more than 
it can satisfy (Erdélyi 1981: 55).18
At this point, we need to make his opinion clear about the significance of the 
tradition of the common sense in the history of philosophy. He has reduced its 
role for the common sense school of the Scottish Enlightenment, neglecting the 
17th-century British ancestors and the antique sources: 
in philosophy, the common sense appeared one hundred years ago in 
Scotland in a short but effective role (Erdélyi 1981: 57).19
This Scottish reference is enough for his controversy with Gusztáv Szontagh, 
who regularly refers to the same Scotsmen and supports his strategy of creating 
a negative image of the philosophical tradition of the common sense as an 
irrelevant, local, historically antiquated trend. He closed the historical overview 
with the following words:
The philosophy of common sense emerged and declined suddenly. After 
Hume, who was sceptical about empirical experiences and offered a novelty 
18 In Hungarian: „a józan ész elméletét elrontották a bölcsészek, midőn többet csináltak belőle, 
mint ami; többet fogtak rá, mint amennyi tőle telik.”
19 In Hungarian: „Bölcsészetben a józan ész rövid, de hatékony szerepléssel mutatkozott a 
skótoknál ezelőtt száz esztendővel.”
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for the progress of philosophy, we cannot speak about English philosophy 
from a point of view of the history of philosophy. […] Both the Scottish 
school and Kant appeared after and against Hume; the Scottish philosophy 
remained a local phenomenon, but the Kantian philosophy occupied the 
world. (Erdélyi 1981: 59–60)20
At the same time, the significant cultural influence of the opposed Scottish 
school on the Continent was also clear for him. It can be considered as superficial, 
but it is essentially urbane and far from the rurality in its every feature:
In Scottish philosophy […], the internal source of our cognition was well 
and nicely elaborated, concerning the moral […], mainly by Scotsmen 
but by French and German authors also. A lot of manuals of the common 
courtesies have their roots in here and have enwreathed the world as a 
liana. Philosophers explained the topics of the ‘etiquette and convenance 
[common courtesies in French]’ […] It was called practice, art of beauty life 
[…]. (Erdélyi 1981: 59)21
Erdélyi here excludes the whole of any educational, cultural, and social 
programme of modernity, based on a concept of common sense, from philosophy. 
One of his opponents, János Hetényi, refers to the same programme in a work 
authored by him (Hetényi 1841). Erdélyi’s note that the criticized literature 
focussed on the beauty of life instead of philosophical problems has directly 
referred to the central concept of the philosophy of his deceased opponent, 
Hetényi, kalobiotismus, from the Greek kalos (beauty) and bios (life). It is 
conspicuous that the referred programme, based on common sense, is urbane 
and reformatory; consequently, its description is contrary to the above analysed 
characterization of common sense as a rural and conservative phenomenon. The 
most conspicuous from this point of view is the relationship of common sense and 
literacy. In an above quoted locus, Erdélyi offers the example of a rural housewife 
who was against the school education of her daughter because a literate girl could 
write letters for her lover, as an adult; and this idea against women’s education 
is based on a common sense judgement in Erdélyi’s interpretation. Later, in the 
20 In Hungarian: „A közös érzelem vagy közrendű értelem bölcsészete amint hamar felkapott, úgy 
hamar is letűnt, s Hume óta, ki a tapasztalást megkétlette, s ezáltal lényeges mozzanatot hoza 
elő a bölcsészeti haladásban, angol bölcsészetről, tudománytörténeti szempontból, mai nap már 
nem lehet beszélni. […] Mind a skótok, mind Kant Hume után és ellen keltek föl, de a skótok 
bölcselkedése helyszerű maradt, míg a kanti észjárás elfoglalta a világot.”
21 In Hungarian: »A skót bölcsészetben […] belső forrása isméreteinknek […] jótékonyan, szépen 
dolgoztatott fel morálra leginkább ugyan magok a skótok, de franciák s németek által is. Az a 
sok illendőségtan mind itt veszi gyökerét, s befutá a világot, mint valami folyondár növény. 
Bölcsészek dolgozák az „etiqette, convenance” rejtelmeit […]. Ezt aztán […] mondák […] 
gyakorlatnak, életszépítő mesterségnek […].«
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last quotation, he refers to an educational programme based on the same common 
sense, with intrinsic elements about the development of communicational skills, 
amongst them, the polite correspondence, usually in different languages, mainly 
offered for women.
At the end of his analysis, Erdélyi described common sense philosophy as a 
failed programme:
Seemingly, the philosophy based on common sense, which was considered 
as unitary, will cure the wound of scepticism. They hoped for the harmony 
of life and philosophy, and it had followers. A kind of reality for empiricism 
has appeared in it; the content could be cleared and increased. But the 
progress of philosophy skipped the doctrine of the common sense because 
it is mere obscurity. (Erdélyi 1981: 58)22
A constant motive of Erdélyi’s historical analysis of common sense philosophy 
is an aversion towards the understanding of the human powers of the Scottish 
Enlightenment, where moral and aesthetic judgements are mixed with the 
processes of thinking, and the whole of the cognition is embedded in the human 
practice. He preferred to maintain a realm of pure rationality free from both 
the empirical cognition and human practice. His opponent, Gusztáv Szontagh, 
clearly formulates the contrary opinion: ‘a philosopher does not think purely for 
the sake of thinking; on the contrary: a human is thinking and investigates the 
truth for the right acting’ (Szontagh 1857: 217).23
We can easily understand Erdélyi’s aversion: the acceptance of an epistemology 
and anthropology based on the sensus communis could immediately destroy the 
dichotomy of the common sense, on the one hand, and the thought, spirit, idea, and 
reason, on the other. This dichotomy is maintainable if all the emotional content 
and social context is linked to the common sense, and the concepts of thought 
(spirit, idea, and reason) remains in the sphere of a context-free, emotionally 
neutral pure rationality. He could regard the arts and literature as parts of the 
national cultures and philosophy, as an affair of the universal humankind in the 
above mentioned loci, based on this dichotomy.
22 In Hungarian: „Úgy látszott, hogy az egységesnek hitt közös érzelmen alapuló bölcsészet 
összeforrasztja ismét azt a sebet, mely a skepticizmus által üttetett a tudományon. Az élet s 
bölcsészet kibékülése váraték tőle; s voltak is követői. Benne valami realitás mutatkozott volna 
az empírizmus számára; tehát tisztult és növekedett volna a tartalom; mindamellett a bölcsészeti 
fejlődés átugrá a közös érzelem vagy józan ész tanát, mert ez csupa bizonytalanság.”
23 In Hungarian: „a bölcselkedő nem gondolkodik pusztán hogy gondolkodjék, sőt inkább az ember 
gondolkodik és keresi az igazságot, hogy helyesen cselekedhessék.”
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Hegelian Sources of Erdélyi’s Critique of the 
Common Sense
The above detailed writing was the first serious work of Erdélyi, formulated 
clearly by the Hegelian ideas; it is explicit in the argumentation against the 
philosophical concept of common sense, as well. In Hegel’s first significant 
philosophical writing entitled ‘The Difference Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s 
System of Philosophy’, published at first in 1802, Hegel identified theoretical 
thinking with speculation, as a counterpart of common sense, in the chapter 
entitled ‘Relation of Speculation to Common Sense’:
For this reason, speculation understands sound intellect [gesunde Menschen- 
verstand] well enough, but the sound intellect [gesunde Menschenverstand] 
cannot understand what speculation is doing. […] Common sense [gesunde 
Menschenverstand] cannot understand speculation; and what is more, it 
must come to hate speculation when it has experience of it; and, unless it is 
in the state of perfect indifference that security confers, it is bound to detest 
and persecute it. (Hegel 1977b: 99–100)
Hegel’s writing includes not only the hierarchy of speculation and common 
sense but the reason of the conservatism of common sense, as well:
In particular, ordinary common sense [gemeine Menschenverstand] is 
bound to see nothing but nullification in those philosophical systems that 
satisfy the demand for the conscious identity by suspending dichotomy in 
such a way that one of the opposites is raised to be the absolute and the 
other nullified. This is particularly offensive if the culture of the time has 
already fixed one of the opposites otherwise. […] Common sense [gesunde 
Menschenverstand] is stubborn; it stubbornly believes itself secure in the 
force of its inertia, believes the non-conscious secure in its primordial 
gravity and opposition to consciousness; believes matter secure against the 
difference that light brings into it just in order to reconstruct the difference 
into a new synthesis at a higher level. (Hegel 1977b: 101–102)
Later, in 1807, in the preface of his early masterpiece, entitled ‘Phenomenology 
of Spirit’, he discusses the concept of insight as a result of the theoretical 
thinking and the concept of edification connected with the emotional approach 
as opposites in the description of the actual state of the self-conscious Spirit. The 
endeavour for the edification is incarnated by his opinion partly in the theory of 
Romanticism of his age, partly in the German Populärphilosophie, and partly in 
the enthusiasm of religious pietism:
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[A]t the stage which self-conscious Spirit has presently reached […] now 
demands from philosophy, not so much knowledge of what it is, as the 
recovery through its agency of that lost sense of solid and substantial 
being. Philosophy is to meet this need, not by opening up the fast-locked 
nature of substance, and raising this to self-consciousness, not by bringing 
consciousness out of its chaos back to an order based on thought, nor to 
the simplicity of the Notion, but rather by running together what thought 
has put asunder, by suppressing the differentiations of the Notion and 
restoring the feeling of essential being: in short, by providing edification 
rather than insight. The ‘beautiful’, the ‘holy’, the ‘eternal’, ‘religion’, and 
‘love’ are the bait required to arouse the desire to bite; not the Notion, but 
ecstasy, not the cold march of necessity in the thing itself, but the ferment 
of enthusiasm, these are supposed to be what sustains and continually 
extends the wealth of substance. (Hegel 1977a: 4–5)
It is verisimilar that Hegel’s ideas formulated in the above quotation had 
an influence on Erdélyi’s statements on the one-sidedness of the emotively 
connected common sense as an opposite of the theory; however, Erdélyi usually 
did not refer to concrete Hegelian loci. This lack of references is probably part 
of his philosophical opinions: Hegel for him was not a philosophical writer but 
the actual zenith of the philosophical thought; consequently, his opinions were 
mentioned as parts of the universal truth, obligatory for everyone, with just a 
general remark that this truth was discovered and perfectly formulated by Hegel.
Hegel discussed the role and the character of common sense in details, especially 
in the subchapter entitled ‘Reason as Lawgiver’ (Hegel 1977a: 252–256), where 
he describes that common sense leads us to a contradiction of terms during the 
formulation of the moral law. The relationship of common sense and theoretical 
thinking is the same in this special case as what was described earlier in general. 
Erdélyi’s loci about the inclination of common sense for the moral judgement 
and the theoretical insufficiency of these judgements are in accordance with the 
referred loci of Hegel’s work.
Hegel later, in the introduction of his ‘Lectures on the History of Philosophy’, 
in the subchapter entitled ‘Philosophy Proper Distinguished from Popular 
Philosophy’ (Hegel 1892: 92–94), extended the concept of Populärphilosophie 
from a concrete German philosophical group to a universal phenomenon of 
history from Cicero through Pascal to the religious mystical thinkers. The only 
common element of these highly different authors is a kind of common sense 
connected with moral sense in Hegel’s opinion:
But the drawback that attaches to this Philosophy is that the ultimate 
appeal even in modern times is made to the fact that men are constituted 
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such as they are by nature, and with this Cicero is very free. Here the moral 
instinct comes into question, only under the name of feeling […]. Feeling 
is first of all laid hold of, then comes reasoning from what is given, but in 
these we can appeal to what is immediate only. Independent thought is 
certainly here advanced; the content too is taken from the self; but we must 
just as necessarily exclude this mode of thinking from Philosophy. (Hegel 
1892: 93)
As we have seen above, Erdélyi has later evaluated the role of common sense 
in general and the role of the philosophical schools operating with the concept of 
common sense in the history of philosophy, using these Hegelian ideas. Erdélyi’s 
well-known metaphor about the building of science is also rooted in Hegel’s 
texts. The German philosopher has formulated his ideas in the preface of his 
Phenomenology of Spirit this way:
Besides, it is not difficult to see that ours is a birth-time and a period of 
transition to a new era. Spirit has broken with the world it has hitherto 
inhabited and imagined, and is of a mind to submerge it in the past, and in 
the labour of its own transformation. […] dissolving bit by bit the structure 
of its previous world, […] Just as little as a building is finished when its 
foundation has been laid, so little is the achieved Notion of the whole the 
whole itself. (Hegel 1977a: 6–7)
Hegel speaks here about a ‘transition to a new era’; several decades later, after 
the detailed explication of Hegel’s system of philosophy – and Hegel’s death –, 
the completion of the renovation has appeared in Erdélyi’s vision, and he follows 
Hegel’s architectural metaphor this way: ‘a new floor has been finished in the 
building of science; we should inhabit and reinforce it for going further’ (Erdélyi 
1981: 96).24
By an overview of Erdélyi’s work, it is clear that he has incorporated with 
Hegel’s loci several elements of the German discourse of the previous generation 
into the Hungarian situation of his age. Amongst Hegel’s targets, German pietism, 
enthusiastic theories of the art philosophy in the circles of sentimentalism and 
romanticism, and the followers of Kant and Fichte did not have a significant 
importance in the Hungarian intellectual life of the 1850s as they had in the German 
discourse a generation ago. The only common element could be the identification 
of the last representatives of the German Populärphilosophie as the opponents 
of Hegel with the representatives of Hungarian harmonistic philosophy, Hetényi 
and Szontagh, as the opponents of Erdélyi. Erdélyi followed this path, as we 
24 In Hungarian: „a tudomány épületén egy új emelet van készen; ezt kell meglaknunk, 
megerősítnünk, hogy tovább léphessünk”.
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have seen above in the case of the identification of ideas incarnating Hetényi’s 
kalobiotismus with the opinions formulated in the continental manuals of 
education, based on the Scottish common sense tradition. This identification is 
false because the philosophies of his opponents, especially in Szontagh’s case, 
are the representatives of the post-Kantian philosophical epoch and offered an 
interesting complex of the elements of the Kantian and Scottish common sense 
philosophies. Erdélyi’s position is characterized by a special form of asynchrony. 
He was a participant of the Hungarian philosophical life in the Reform Era, as 
well; but he was silent in the late 1830s and early 1840s, when a controversy 
regarding the Hegelian philosophy was in the focus of Hungarian philosophical 
life, with the participation of Szontagh as the protagonist on the anti-Hegelian side, 
and re-discovered Hegel in the following period when Hegel was not frequently 
read in European intellectual life. He never reflected on Hetényi’s or Szontagh’s 
works when they were published, but he offered a retrospective evaluation of 
their œuvre. This asynchrony is the root of Erdélyi’s misinterpretation of his 
opponents’ philosophy; they never spoke about popular language but a clear 
Hungarian terminology; instead of a national particularism of philosophy, they 
searched the position of philosophy in the process of cultural nation building. 
One of the most important differences between their opinions about the essence 
of philosophy was included in his last debate with Gusztáv Szontagh.
Erdélyi’s thought is characterized by the dichotomy of speculative thinking and 
human practice; in Szontagh’s ideas, all forms of theory are always embedded in 
human activity, in individual and societal practice, while all distinctions between 
vita activa and contemplativa are false. A triumph of either of them over the other 
one cannot be achieved following the method used by Erdélyi, evaluating each 
other as a non-philosophical system of ideas. We can see that this asynchrony 
of Erdélyi’s reflection is the main cause of his anachronistic judgements and 
misinterpretations. There was not any sign of his controversy with Szontagh 
before; it is symptomatic that in his memoirs written several years before their 
debate Szontagh mentioned Erdélyi’s name just in a single locus, as a source of an 
anecdote from Erdélyi’s alma mater, the College of Sárospatak (Szontagh 2017: 
152). Under conditions of his misinterpretations based on the asynchrony of his 
work, a question has emerged; how have his ideas become a standard opinion 
in the Hungarian cultural tradition concerning the description of philosophy of 
his opponents and the relationship of common sense and theoretical thought in 
general. This problem is linked with the history of the canonization process of 
Erdélyi’s œuvre amongst the 19th-century classics of Hungarian culture.
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The Role of the Concept of Common Sense in the 
Modern Programme of Public Philosophy
The concept of common sense (sensus communis) has another, more essential 
role in modern philosophy than the above mentioned ones, concerning the 
reformulation of self-identity and the role of philosophy under conditions 
of the changed structure of scholars’ public sphere. Consequently, Erdélyi’s 
re-interpretation of the role of common sense has a significant influence 
in the Hungarian tradition on the self-identification of philosophy. This 
communicational turn was twofold; it was linguistically a change from Latin 
to the national languages and in the institutional background a turn from the 
old-fashioned disputes at the universities to the scenery of the modern open 
realm dominated by the press and periodicals. This process is characterized 
by the extension and fragmentation of the audience at the same time; the large 
domestic audiences of philosophy will be separated from one another because 
of their native vernaculars. (For a recent analysis of a Hungarian aspect of this 
communicational turn, see Mester 2018.)
The idea of the link between the urban culture and philosophy is as ancient as 
Cicero’s Tusculanae disputationes; as he has formulated it: ‘Socrates was the first 
who brought down philosophy from the heavens, placed it in cities, introduced it 
into families, and obliged it to examine into life and morals, and good and evil’ 
(Cicero 1877: 166; my italics).
This topic of urbane philosophy has been connected with the term of sensus 
communis in Cicero’s œuvre. This stoic term, Latinized by Cicero, had a new 
position as common sense in early modernity, since Shaftesbury’s masterpiece, 
when the new phenomenon of public philosophy emerged as an answer to the 
turn of the structure of the European philosophical communication. The usage of 
the term common sense went always hand by hand with the considerations of the 
possibilities of the public philosophy in the period of the Scottish Enlightenment 
and the German Populärphilosophie. In the intellectual movements of East-
Central Europe, this idea was combined with other German interpretations of 
the turn of the structure of the public sphere, included in the Kantian twin terms 
of philosophia in sensu scholastico and philosophia in sensu cosmopolitico 
and Herder’s description of the historically changing structure and concept of 
publicum. (Erdélyi has distanced himself from them, as well; he was against 
Kant’s critique of reason based on Hegelian ideas, and Herder’s ideas about the 
national character represented for him a sub-philosophical level of culture.) 
In the Hungarian philosophical life, this problem has emerged as the paradox 
of philosophia in sensu cosmopolitico cultivated in Hungarian. The solution 
was a programme of a public philosophy as a continuous theoretical critique of 
Hungarian arts, literature, politics, economy, and society, as part of the collective 
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development of common sense, based on the programme of politeness and 
refinement known from the Scottish Enlightenment. These ideas have appeared 
in the works of the authors of the Hungarian Harmonistic philosophy, Hetényi 
and Szontagh; especially Hetényi’s works on the history of the Hungarian cities 
and Szontagh’s programme for the development of the Hungarian philosophy 
were clear representatives of these ideas.
Conclusions
The target of the above discussed common sense tradition was re-positioning 
philosophy within a new public realm. In the Hungarian case, the programme 
was to put philosophy cultivated in Hungarian into the new system of the so-
called national sciences and to have a theoretical interpretation and conscious 
design of this process. In other words, national philosophy as a special version of 
modern public philosophies in the 19th-century East-Central Europe has adapted 
to the system of the new modern national culture and wanted to fulfil the role 
of the philosophical interpreter of this new type of political community called 
nation and the designer of this community at the same time. By this system of 
ideas, from the cultural, political, economic, scientific, and artistic development 
of a country, a theoretical reflection appeared in the open sphere and based on 
common sense, which can create a national community and a national culture, 
connected with the development of the actual level of the concrete appearances 
of common sense, as well. The clearest and the most radical manifestation of 
this approach to philosophy and science, linked closely to common life, is the 
decision of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS) in March 1848 that the 
HAS expresses its acknowledgment for the people of the city of Pest because the 
people have enforced the liberty of the press, what is a fundamental requirement 
of any scientific or cultural activity.
After the military defeat of the revolution, this conception, which was 
connected to the rule of the public opinion and the nation, could not be easily 
upheld. Erdélyi’s above detailed work was published at this time and in this 
context. His target was the concept of national philosophy, but he destroyed the 
philosophical concept of nation and made difficult the theoretical analysis of the 
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